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1. Democratization and Islamization 
The Arab Spring has generated the newest attempts at democratization in the Arab World. 
Following the successful ouster of autocratic leadership, both Tunisia and Egypt have 
experienced relatively free and fair elections, after decades of authoritarian rule (Ji-Hyang 
2012: 146; Kienle 2012). While the demonstrations started out with a secular base, both 
elections were dominated and eventually won by Islamist parties1; Ennahda in Tunisia and 
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt. The Islamists’ victories tempered the initial optimism 
of many western observers for democratization, because of the commonly held belief that 
democracy cannot function without secularism. Specifically, the concern is that democratic 
principles, such as pluralism and freedom of religion fundamentally clash with Islamic 
principles (Lipset 1959; Huntington 1993; Roy 2012). A major concern is the Islamists support 
for sharia2. The incorporation of sharia into the legal framework is considered to contrast 
democratic principles because of the envisioned supremacy of sharia over other laws 
(including international treaties); the status of women under sharia; cruel punishments 
prescribed by sharia; and violations of human rights (Otto 2010: 29; Pupcenoks, 2012 273). 
Calls for Islamization and democratization have increased in many Arab countries 
since the 80s (Otto 2009: 74; Tessler 2002: 339), questioning the incompatibility of 
democracy and Islam. Subsequently, there are those who believe that there is in fact no 
reason to believe that countries cannot become more democratic as well as more religious 
at the same time (Perthes 2012; Pupcenoks 2012: 273). The Arab world has experienced few 
episodes of genuine democratization, leading many observers to ascertain that democracy 
was not aspired or even viable in the Arab world (Tessler 2002: 340). The ouster of 
autocratic leadership disproves the first point, but the second point, whether democracy is 
viable, has yet to be determined and is now under more scrutiny than ever. These are not 
the first attempts of democratization within an Islamic framework, however. While 
authoritarianism has been the predominant form of government in the Arab world for 
decades, this pattern is contrasted with cases outside the Arab world; Turkey, and Pakistan. 
Islamist parties in these countries have, with varying degrees of success, combined 
democratic and Islamic principles, and can guide the analysis of new cases (Pupcenoks, 2012). 
                                                     
1
 Political parties who pursue an active role of Islam in politics and the public sphere 
2
 Islamic law, based on the Qur’an and Hadith, the prophet’s teachings 
Arthur Belle |     Compatibility of Islam and Democracy: 
                              Islamist Parties in Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab Spring 
- 3 - 
 
This paper will examine the new cases, Ennahda in Tunisia and MB in Egypt, which 
have reignited the debate whether Islam is compatible with democracy. This debate is 
particularly contentious due to Western anxiety about the prospect of political Islam. The 
fear is that democracy in the Arab world will move these countries towards Islamic 
fundamentalism. The duality of the West in this matter is well described by Otto, observing 
that: “on the one hand, the West pushes for free elections; on the other hand, it is not 
always ready to accept the outcome” (Otto 2010: 649).  
The Islamist political parties face an uphill battle to prove their commitment to 
democracy and the compatibility of Islam and democracy in general. Islamist parties have to 
convince secularists3 that political Islam is capable of respecting the rights and views of 
(non)religious minorities. Simultaneously, they have to convince the puritans4 that the 
democratic road is the best option for Islamist political control. Finally, they have to convince 
the rest of the world that democratic Islamization does not lead to fundamentalism. The 
question now, and the subject of this thesis, is whether the Islamist parties can steer this 
process of democratization within an Islamic framework in the right direction. The main goal 
of this study is to assess how the alleged contradiction between Islamic principles and 
democratic principles has played out in practice and how this could affect the debate about 
the compatibility of democracy and Islam. The following research question has been 
formulated to this end:  
 
How did Ennahda and MB reconcile the alleged ideological contradiction between 
Islamic and democratic principles in the process of democratic Islamization? 
 
The debate about the compatibility of democracy and Islam is obscured by relatively few 
numbers of cases in which this can be studied and the debate remains for a large part 
hypothetical (Pupcenoks, 2012: 273). Success in these cases can induce similar processes in 
neighboring countries (Diamond 2010: 102), whereas failure can entrench the notion that 
Islam is not compatible with democracy (Clement, Ji-Hyang and Parks 2012: 17; Anderson 
2012: 48). 
                                                     
3
 Those that believe that Islam should not play a prominent role in the political, or the public arena. 
4
 Islamists who believe Islamic principles should prevail over democratic principles and support the direct 
implementation of sharia. 
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 This paper will focus on two main themes: 1) How Islamist parties reconcile the 
alleged ideological contradictions between Islamic and democratic principles in policy-
making; and 2) How Islamist parties conducted the process of democratic Islamization5. 
These themes will be elaborated upon in the theoretical framework, where they are 
illustrated by the cases of Islamist political parties in Turkey and Pakistan. First, the 
compatibility of democracy and Islam will be examined on the basis of existing scholarly 
discussion and public survey research. This project will contribute to the discussion by 
analyzing two new cases of Islamist political parties in power, Ennahda and MB, and assess 
what their experiences tell us about the compatibility of democracy and Islam in general, as 
well as the prospects of democratic Islamization in these countries and in the wider region. 
 
2. Democracy and Islam 
Some authors point to a theoretical incompatibility between democratic and Islamic 
principles (Huntington 1993; Roy 2012), while others maintain that there is no fundamental 
conflict (Perthes 2012; Pupcenoks 2012: 273). While scholarly discourse is yet unresolved, 
popular opinion seems to reconcile democracy and Islam, as the majority of Muslims in the 
Arab world equally support democratic and Islamic norms (Tessler 2002: 348). To complicate 
matters further, the only observable cases until now6 give two different accounts, as 
democracy and Islam appear to be compatible in Turkey, but much less so in Pakistan. To 
sum up, the compatibility of democracy and Islam finds support in popular opinion, but 
conflicting accounts in both scholarly discourse and in practice.  
 
2.1 Scholarly Discourse on Compatibility of Democracy and Islam 
Much has been written about the compatibility of democracy and Islam (Brumberg and 
Diamond 2003; Sadiki 2004). While, the vast majority of the populations of the Arab world is 
religious (Roy 2012: 6), different groups have different ideas about the role religion should 
play in the public and the private sphere (Mogahed 2009; Brumberg 2003a: 269; Tessler, 
Jamal and Robbins 2012:  95). In broad terms there are three main views on how Islamic 
principles and democratic principles should relate to each other in political Islam; the secular 
                                                     
5
 A process of Islamization of society within democratic boundaries. 
6
 Islamist parties in Turkey and Pakistan 
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view, the moderate Islamist view7, and the puritan Islamist view. Each can be found among 
the main strands of Islam itself, be it Sunni or Shi’a. The main popular divide in Muslim 
countries is generally between moderates and puritans, while the support for a secular 
orientation is smaller (Tessler, Jamal and Robbins 2012: 95). Each of these views has 
different implications for the compatibility of Islamic beliefs and democratic principles. 
Seculars support the notion that religion belongs in the private sphere. That is not to 
say they are not religious, they simply believe religion should not play a role in politics. 
However, the process of secularization8 originated in Western Europe (Filaly-Ansary 2003b: 
235). Consequently, the phrase ‘separation of church and state’ is well known, while the 
phrase ‘separation of mosque and state’ is only a derivation of the original. The principle of 
separation of state and religion has spread to the Muslim world by colonial influences, but 
has never developed internally or autonomously (Filaly-Ansary 2003b: 235). Movements 
toward secularization in the Middle East have encountered significant resistance, 
entrenching religious identity in almost all instances (Allott 1980: 189). Secularists are 
generally only a small minority in the Arab World, and secularism is often equated with 
atheism and Westernization, leading most religious people wary of secular discourse (Filaly-
Ansary 2003a: 195).  
Both moderate Islamists and puritan Islamists oppose the complete separation of 
politics and religion (Roy 2012: 6). Moderate Islamists do not support the necessity of 
secularism for democracy, but neither do they reject democratic principles (Tessler, Jamal 
and Robbins 2012: 98). However, they do not wish to copy the European ideal of liberal 
democracy. Rather, they support a practical application of democratic principles within a 
religious framework (Mogahed 2009: 79; Diamond 2008: 277). They highlight liberty – 
individually and as a community – justice, and freedom from oppressors (Masmoudi 2003: 
258-259). Moderate Islamists do not view modernity as something evil, they want to 
embrace it, but distinctly within a Muslim framework (Kubba 2003: 266).  
In contrast, puritans believe that religious principles should take precedence and 
argue for the direct implementation of sharia in all aspects of life. Puritan Islamists often 
accuse moderates of political opportunism when they accept democratic norms, diverging 
                                                     
7
 Islamists that have embraced the basic principles of democracy, though distinctly within their own Islamic 
framework. 
8
 A process of the separation of state and religion. 
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from the true path of Islam. They are a conservative current, affiliated with Wahhabi 
thought in Saudi Arabia (Pratt 2007: 166). They further reject anything that has its origin in 
Western culture. Any democratic rhetoric employed by moderates, including liberalization 
and democratization, is considered a purely Western product and thus anti-religious (Sivan 
2003: 22). They reject modern notions of minority or women’s rights and advocate a political 
system resembling the 7th century caliphates.  
Moderate Islamists have shown a commitment to democratic principles, such as 
popular sovereignty, political pluralism, human rights, and minority rights (Diamond 2008: 
284). They support the rule of law, good governance, an independent and just judiciary, 
freedom of expression, etc., the so-called building blocks of democracy (Filaly-Ansary 2003a: 
201-202). It is argued that none of these principles are contradictory to Islamic teachings. 
Many can actually find a basis in Islamic principles. Such principles include ijtihad (rational 
interpretation), shura (consultation), and ijma (community consensus). These values are not 
contradictory to democracy, but rather complementary to democracy (Esposito and 
Mogahed 2007: 55). This liberal interpretation of religious doctrine has made the 
incorporation of concepts such as human rights, pluralism, and democracy possible for 
moderate Islamists (Rosefsky Wickam 2004: 207).  
The compatibility of Islamic and democratic principles thus finds support at a 
theoretical level in the approach of moderate Islamist parties, but of course has to be 
determined in practice. Moderate Islamists have the best chance of reconciling democratic 
and Islamic principles9. To what extent populations wish to endorse both democratic and 
Islamic norms will determine the popular support these moderate Islamists can acquire. 
 
2.2 Popular Opinion on Democracy and Islam 
Social surveys have shown that a majority of Muslims has come to believe that democratic 
norms can complement Islamic norms. People with a stronger Islamic identity, do not show 
lower support for democracy (Tessler 2002: 348; Diamond 2010: 102). In fact, the majority of 
Muslims in Arab countries attach an equal importance to Islamic principles as to democratic 
principles. Moreover, there is no systematic difference in these views between men or 
                                                     
9
 Secular orientations will be rejected by Islamists, while puritan orientations will be rejected by both seculars 
and moderate Islamists. 
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women, between different classes, or between different ages (Diamond 2008: 277). Women, 
who are thought to be oppressed by Islamic principles, want equal rights within a religious 
framework as well (Esposito and Mogahed 2007: 48). This means that the basic principles of 
democracy and Islam do not inherently clash at a personal level and the emergence of a 
genuine democratic civic culture is not fundamentally hampered by individual Islamic 
identities (Tessler 2002: 350). In this view, a democratic system has become the principal 
source of legitimacy for a political system, even within Muslim societies (Filaly-Ansary 2003a: 
201). This is reflected by the view of moderate Islamist parties who have come to represent 
the view of the majority of Muslims in the world (Masmoudi 2003: 259).  
The discussion about the compatibility of democracy and Islam has often been 
obstructed by confusing extremist fundamentalist beliefs with mainstream Muslim beliefs 
(Esposito and Mogahed 2007: x). In this way the Muslim world is equated with suicide 
bombers and jihad fighters. The question, what the majority of Muslims really think and 
want, is not often considered in the West, and the reluctance of the West to openly support 
democracy in the Arab world has only reinforced the rise of fundamentalists (Esposito and 
Mogahed 2007: xi). As long as the West supported the secular autocrats, moderate Islamists 
were caught between the secular autocrats and the more fundamentalist Islamists, unable 
to prove their commitment to democratic principles. 
As a result, moderate Islamists have trouble establishing a loyal support base 
(Brumberg 2003b: 43). Though puritans and secularists are only minority groups, they are 
traditionally the ones competing for power in most of the Arab world (Masmoudi 2003: 259-
260). This competition between secularists and puritans has caused the West to depreciate 
the distinction between moderate Islamists and puritan Islamists, resulting in a Western 
attitude that perceives Islam as a whole as a threat, while only the puritans are truly anti-
modern and anti-western (Masmoudi 2003: 260).  
Public surveys now show that the incompatibility of democracy and Islam does not 
hold at the personal level of the majority of Muslims. Moreover, these views are now 
represented by moderate Islamist parties who have shown a commitment to democratic 
principles in their rhetoric and party platforms. However, the extent to which moderate 
Islamist parties can uphold this commitment cannot be determined at a theoretical level, or 
by the analysis of public surveys. In the end, this commitment can only be demonstrated in 
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practice and has to be assessed empirically. The next section will provide a framework for 
empirical analysis and show how this has previously been applied to Turkey and Pakistan. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
The previous section focused on theoretical discourse and popular opinion to assess to what 
extent democracy and Islam are compatible. However, this approach is limited when it is not 
complemented with the empirical analysis of real cases where Islamist parties have operated 
in the democratic arena (Ji-Hyang 2012). Such studies have previously focused primarily on 
Turkey and Pakistan, as these are the only available empirical cases (Pupcenoks 2012; Kirisci 
2012). This section will clarify the existing analyses of these cases, as well as lay out the 
framework for the analysis of new cases. For the empirical analysis of how Islamist parties 
reconcile the alleged incompatibility of democracy and Islam two approaches have been 
used (Pupcenoks 2012; Ji-Hiang 2012; Kirisci 2012). The first is how the process of 
democratic Islamization is conducted. The second is the manifestation of ideological tensions 
between Islamic and democratic principles in practice (Pupcenoks 2012).  
Analysis of the process of democratic Islamization takes into account to what extent 
Islamist parties are able to compromise on their religious agenda in order to build a coalition 
with other (secular) political parties. On the one hand, this questions whether parties aim to 
seek consensus on their political agenda, or whether they push through their agenda despite 
opposition. On the other hand, this looks at whether the party opts for a direct approach to 
Islamization, or opts for a more subtle approach of Islamization. These aspects illustrate the 
parties’ commitment to pluralism, minority rights, religious freedom and their ability to deal 
with criticism and freedom of expression (Ji-Hyang 2012).  
Ideological contradictions manifest themselves more substantively in policy-making. 
A strict application of sharia for instance, limits women’s rights, minority rights and religious 
freedom in education, the public sphere, and even in economic activities (Ji-Hyang 2012). 
Both the process of democratic Islamization and possible ideological contradictions are 
examined more fully below. 
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3.1 Process of Democratic Islamization 
The AKP10 in Turkey and the MMA11 in Pakistan represent two cases where a process of 
Islamization took place within a democratic framework. As such, their experiences can be 
used to inform the discussion about the compatibility of democracy and Islam, as well as 
present a framework of analysis for new cases. This section will present the different 
approaches each has used for Islamic political control, and the process of democratic 
Islamization. Both parties came to power through electoral means in the early 2000s, though 
the subsequent paths chosen by these parties diverge considerably, as do the results they 
have achieved (Pupcenoks, 2012 273).  
The AKP in Turkey came to power in 2002 and employed a framework that has been 
styled as “indirect, subtle Islamization”. AKP leadership stressed Turkey remains a 
democratic and secular state and the party is now considered to be a model Islamist party 
supporting human rights, pluralism and gender equality (Ji-Hyang 2012: 144; Kirisci 2012: 
161). Initially, the party did not press for overt Islamization, though some attempts to repeal 
the headscarf ban12 were undertaken, leading to tensions with religious minorities and 
proponents of the secular state (Pupcenoks, 2012: 282). The main success of Islamization 
arises from the party’s ability to appoint Islamists to state administration and other public 
positions. Continued electoral success emboldened the party to more firmly pursue their 
religious agenda, intensifying their attempts to repeal the headscarf ban (Pupcenoks, 2012: 
282). In most political matters, the party has had a tendency to compromise and assume a 
pragmatic attitude (Ji-Hyang 2012: 143). The prospect of EU membership for instance 
ensured the adherence to human rights and minority rights (Altan Olcay and Icduygu 2014: 
169). This subtlety in matters of religion and politics has made Islam increasingly present in 
public life, though in a generally tolerant and democratic fashion, embracing democratic 
principles and working with the west (Pupcenoks, 2012: 287). 
In contrast, the approach in Pakistan has been termed as “direct, conflictual 
Islamization” (Pupcenoks, 2012: 280). The MMA came to power in 2002, as an alliance of six 
political parties seeking the Islamization of society. They initiated this process with the 
Islamization of educational and social policies, banning alcohol and pubs, and implementing 
                                                     
10
 Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or Justice and Development Party (EN). 
11
 Muttahida Majlis–e–Amal or United Council of Action (EN). 
12
 A law originating from the foundation of the modern Turkish state. 
Arthur Belle |     Compatibility of Islam and Democracy: 
                              Islamist Parties in Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab Spring 
- 10 - 
 
sharia in several provinces, including obligatory prayer in schools, mandatory veils for girls, 
and the general limitation of women’s participation in the public sphere (Pupcenoks, 2012: 
280). Their attempts were mostly thwarted by a fierce opposition from the national 
government and the courts, promptly repealing some of their laws (Pupcenoks, 2012: 278). 
The mode of Islamization was much more repressive as in Turkey, leaving a larger impact on 
public life and relations with the west (Pupcenoks, 2012: 287). The directness of the 
attempts of Islamization also meant a broader opposition from secular forces, courts and 
minority groups, making the process more conflictual.  
The AKP and MMA adopted two distinct paths of Islamization: the consensus-seeking 
and subtle course taken by the AKP and the direct and conflicted course pursued by the 
MMA (Pupcenoks 2012). This is illustrated in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Process of Democratic Islamization 
 
The approach of the AKP is more conciliatory, taking opposition to an Islamizing agenda into 
account and attempting to work together. In the meantime, they do follow an Islamizing 
course, though subtly through the appointments of sympathizers to state administration. In 
contrast, the approach of the MMA is more resolute and pushes for the direct 
implementation of Islamic moral values on society, rather disregarding the opposition that 
can exist to such reform. This has resulted in a number of conflicts with the opposition, civil 
society and the judiciary (Pupcenoks 2012).  
In conclusion, AKP’s approach, seeking consensus and pursuing Islamization only in a 
subtle fashion, in its pragmatism is compatible with democratic norms. In contrast, the 
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hardline-approach of the MMA in Pakistan, pursuing direct Islamization without compromise, 
clashed with democratic norms.  
 
3.2 Ideological Contradictions between Islamic and Democratic Principles  
The different approaches to democratic Islamization illustrated above show that democracy 
and Islam are not necessarily incompatible in practice, as the AKP in Turkey shows, but 
certainly can be, as the MMA in Pakistan shows. This is partly due to the process of 
democratic Islamization (see figure 1), but also relates to the content of Islamization. Here, 
the latter will be highlighted to assess how and in what ways Islamization can clash with 
democratic principles, and lay out a framework for the empirical analysis to follow. 
Society and religion have historically been intertwined in Islam (Esposito and 
Mogahed 2007: 26), and this sentiment is still present in Muslim communities today (Lewis 
2003: 218). Islamist political parties acquire their legitimacy through their commitment to 
the Qur’an and religious principles. They rely on the Muslim identity of supporters that has 
grown through Islamic organizations active in society, preaching regular prayer and piety. 
During the past few decades Islamic ideas have more and more come to influence the 
discussion about how Islamic teachings should influence the public sphere (Tessler 2002: 
339). Policy areas in the public sphere that are affected by the application of Islamic 
principles include educational, social and economic policies (Pupcenoks 2012: 275). In each 
of these policy areas the strict application of Islamic principles can be at odds with 
democratic principles, including human rights, pluralism, minority rights, freedom of 
expression and freedom of religion (Diamond 2008: 284). However, whether they clash 
largely depends on the degree to which Islamic principles are enforced.  
Islamization of education can manifest itself by strengthening religious schools, 
applying Islamic curricula and promoting Islamic religious doctrine in schools and segregating 
the classrooms between boys and girls (Pupcenoks 2012: 275). The impact of such policies 
largely depends on the extent to which the Islamic curricula are mandatory; and the extent 
to which girls receive an equivalent education to boys. Social policies that can be affected 
are the use of headscarves in public life, obligatory prayer at state institutions, the 
criminalization of adultery, and the limitation of women’s participation in the public sphere 
(Pupcenoks 2012: 275). Such policies primarily depreciate the role of women in society, as 
well as non-Muslim groups. Such policies are classified as undemocratic, but can also take 
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milder forms, such as a repeal of the headscarf ban as in Turkey, which can be framed as a 
freedom of religion issue (Pupcenoks 2012). Economic Islamization includes the restriction 
‘’un-Islamic” products such as alcohol, restriction of pubs, and the regulation of the film and 
music industries in line with moral values (Pupcenoks 2012: 275; Ji-Hyang 2012: 145). Such 
policies are considerably anti-modern. The extent to which these policies are applied to the 
society as a whole, disregarding minority views, gives these policies considerable 
undemocratic potential.  
A puritan application of sharia quite clearly clashes with democratic principles 
(Tessler, Jamal and Robbins 2012: 95). They reject democratic principles and object to any 
liberal interpretation of the Qur’an. Puritan Islamists resent the incorporation of democratic 
principles in moderate Islamist parties, and argue for the primacy of religious doctrine. Their 
rhetoric is outspokenly anti-democratic, and they oppose freedom of religion, freedom of 
expression, minority rights and political pluralism, as this negates religious supremacy.  
However, there is a vast divergence between Islamic schools when it comes to how 
Islamic beliefs, or sharia, should play a role in the public sphere (Otto 2010: 40). Moderate 
interpretations of the sharia can be compatible or even enforce democratic principles and 
the rule of law (Otto 2009: 76). Puritan applications of sharia are only found in Iran and 
Saudi-Arabia. Furthermore, sharia deals with a wide number of issues, not all of which have 
to be embraced. Countries that embrace some form of sharia do so in widely varying 
degrees, on a varying number of issues (Otto 2009). To illustrate, some parts of sharia were 
also applied under the secular autocratic regime in Egypt, most notably family law (Otto 
2010: 630). Incorporating sharia cannot be equated with imposing a theocracy (Esposito and 
Mogahed 2007: 50).  
If Islamic principles are strictly applied according to sharia, democratic principles are 
threatened in a number of policy-areas, most notably education, social policies and 
economics. How Islamist parties deal with these issues, and to what extent they are willing 
to commit to a lenient application of Islamic principles and forego the direct application of 
sharia, is paramount for their ability to reconcile democratic and Islamic principles. Dividing 
the empirical analysis along these policy-areas helps to get a clear view to what extent 
Islamist parties have substantively pursued the process of Islamization, and how this relates 
to democratic principles in each policy-area (Pupcenoks 2012). 
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4. Democratization in Tunisia and Egypt 
Apart from the cases of AKP and MMA we have little empirical knowledge about the 
compatibility of democracy and Islam. Arguments for both camps can be found in Turkey 
and Pakistan, as the consensus-seeking and subtle approach of the AKP is largely compatible 
with democratic norms, while the MMA’s direct and conflicted approach is clearly not 
(Pupcenoks 2012; Kirisci 2012). Substantively, the project of Islamization was more profound 
in Pakistan, with the direct application of sharia in social policies (Pupcenoks 2012; 278), 
while the AKP refrained from thorough Islamizing policies (Kirisci 2012). As such the 
discussion about the compatibility of democracy and Islam is unresolved, both at a 
theoretical level and in practice. With the analysis of the new cases in Tunisia and Egypt this 
study aims to further illuminate whether, or to what extent, Islamic principles can be 
compatible with democratic principles.  
Following political turnovers and subsequent electoral victories in 2011, Ennahda in 
Tunisia and MB in Egypt have embarked on a process of democratization within an Islamic 
framework. As such these cases offer the newest insights in the discussion about the 
compatibility of democracy and Islam and the underlying dynamics at play. Both parties are 
moderate mainstream Islamist political parties (Joffe 2011: 526), and are at least nominally 
committed to democratic principles. This offers a good test for the compatibility of 
democracy and Islam, as moderate Islamist parties are the ‘most likely cases’ to successfully 
combine democratic and Islamic principles (Rosefsky Wickam 2004).  
 In a region where democracy and Islam have rarely gone hand in hand, Ennahda and 
MB constitute deviant cases, which can be used to disconfirm a deterministic argument 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008: 302), and possibly yield new hypotheses (Mahoney 2007: 125). 
The deterministic argument that they would disconfirm (or confirm) is the assessment that 
Islam is inherently incompatible with democracy. As the new forerunners of these forces in 
the region, their experiences will shed a light on the prospects of democratization within an 
Islamic framework for the entire region (Springborg 2011: 7). If Islamist democracy is 
successful in these cases, it may snowball to other countries (Diamond 2010: 102).  
Evidently, the cases of MB and Ennahda are not identical, but many similarities exist 
(Dupont and Passy 2011: 450). In both countries, a secular pro-democracy movement 
spurred a revolt that led to the ouster of the ruling president and the abolishment of the 
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ruling party. Subsequently, Islamist parties won the first free and fair elections in decades. 
During the election campaign, both parties combined their conservative Islamic rhetoric with 
more progressive democratic rhetoric, and in so doing managed to thwart more puritan 
Islamist alternatives. These commonalities provide a good framework for comparative 
analysis, and will also help to understand the variations that persist (Dupont and Passy 2011: 
450). 
Authoritarian regimes in the Arab world had been largely unscathed by the third 
wave of democratization (70’s-90’s). While democracy had significantly expanded in other 
regions of the world, this process skipped the Arab world. Some genuine liberalization did 
take place in the 80s, but as the autocratic regimes were confronted with increasing Islamist 
influences they subsequently reversed the liberalizations (Sivan 2003: 15-16). This left the 
autocratic regimes quite wary of Islamists, resulting in a strategy of repression (Sivan 2003: 
21). The imperviousness of autocratic regimes waned in the beginning of 2011, when the 
successful overthrow of the longtime-dictator Ben Ali in Tunisia snowballed into widespread 
demonstrations across the Arab world, demanding an end to corruption and democratic 
governance. In a spark of optimism, these popular upsurges have been referred to as the 
‘Arab Spring’, indicating an awakening from a long autocratic ‘winter’ (Joffe 2011: 507).  
The autocrats Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak were overthrown and their 
dominant political parties, Rassemblement Constitutionel Démocratique (RCD) and National 
Democratic Party (NDP) respectively, abolished. The social movements in Egypt and Tunisia 
occurred mostly without widespread violence, leaving these two countries with relatively 
good prospects for a peaceful transition to democracy (Nepstad 2011: 485). In other 
countries demonstrations led to regime concessions (i.e. Oman, Jordan, Morocco and Algeria 
and Iraq) while demonstrations have led to widespread violence or even civil war in others 
(i.e. Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria)(Springborg 2011: 5). The relatively swift fall of the 
regimes in Tunisia and Egypt was in stark contrast with the assessments of many observers 
who had not correctly recognized the fragility of these regimes against widespread 
opposition (Joffe 2011: 507; Dupont and Passy 2011: 447), nor the democratic aspirations of 
Arab populations. The extent to which these democratic aspirations will be satisfied depends 
on the Islamist parties in the driver’s seat of the process of democratization. 
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5. Research Design 
The objective of this research is to find out in what ways the cases in Tunisia and Egypt add 
to our understanding of the compatibility of democracy and Islam in practice. Previous 
analyses of the AKP in Turkey and the MMA in Pakistan have provided a framework to assess 
to what extent Islamist parties have managed to reconcile the alleged contradiction between 
Islamic and democratic principles. As the verdict is not out yet, this study will extend the 
analysis about the compatibility democracy and Islam to two new cases, Ennahda in Tunisia 
and MB in Egypt. The analysis of this study will be limited to the time periods during which 
the Islamist parties were in power, as these time periods best illustrate the possible conflicts 
between democratic and Islamic principles in practice. For Ennahda this period lasted from 
October 2011 until October 2014. The MB has been in power from November 2011 until 
June 2013. During their period in power, their commitment to democratic principles can be 
observed both in terms of process and in terms of their ideology.  
 
5.1 Research Approach 
Democratization within an Islamic framework has taken place only a limited number of times, 
chiefly outside the Arab world. As such, a large-N study is impossible and an in-depth 
analysis of the phenomena is more suitable to understand the complex processes at play 
(Caporaso 2009: 68; Mahoney 2007: 122). The analysis is decidedly exploratory in nature and 
primarily aims at understanding instead of explaining or predicting (Caporaso 2009: 70). 
Once we understand these cases we can start to understand a larger class of similar units 
(Gerring 2004: 342). If we add our understanding of the role of Islamist parties in the 
democratic arena in Tunisia and Egypt to what we have already learned from the AKP and 
the MMA, we can then better understand the prospects of political Islam in the wider region. 
This study will employ the method of structured, focused comparison, to create an 
analytic narrative where special emphasis is placed on the details of the cases, but the 
research maintains a degree of generalizability by confining the analysis to a strict 
framework (Levi 1999: 155). The focus of this research is embedded in the formulation of 
guiding questions that reflect the research objective and can be used systematically to 
analyze the cases under study. By focusing on a limited number of aspects of the 
phenomenon at hand the data collection can be structured and standardized to ensure some 
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level of comparability between the cases (George and Bennett 2005: 67), and discipline the 
researcher to keep focus (Levi 1999: 166). This standardization can potentially also benefit 
future research that can employ the same framework to extend the analysis to other cases.  
The analysis of this study has been split into two main themes: 1) How Islamist 
parties reconcile the alleged ideological contradictions between Islamic and democratic 
principles in policy-making; and 2) How Islamist parties conducted the process of democratic 
Islamization. These themes are operationalized into guiding questions below. 
 
Ideological clash of Islamic and democratic principles 
The most salient policy-areas where Islamic principles can clash with democratic principles 
are education, social policies and economics (Pupcenoks 2012). The Islamization of 
education aims to educate new generations within the values and principles of Islam and 
instill them with an Islamic moral code. This can be pursued in a number of ways: 1) Does 
the party attempt to align school curricula with Islamic principles and values? Islamic values 
can be included in curricula as religious references, familial roles of women, Islamic 
jurisprudence and the de-secularization of textbooks. 2) Does the party attempt to Islamize 
of the educational system? This involves the placement of Islamists in educational 
institutions and increased support for religious schools. 3) Does the party aim to implement 
gender segregation in schools? Gender segregation is used by Islamists to instill different 
societal roles to boys and girls and to maintain public decency. The latter can also be 
achieved by forcing girls to wear a veil to school. Reforms aimed at the Islamization of 
education can be at odds with (religious) minority rights, women’s rights and limit pluralistic 
views in society.  
Social policies of Islamist parties promote the role of Islamic principles in public life, 
in order to ensure that the public sphere is regulated by Islamic moral norms. 4) Does the 
party obligate or authorize the use of a headscarf in public? Depending on the starting 
position, Islamists have aimed at allowing or promoting the use of the headscarf in public, or 
the obligation to wear a headscarf in public. 5) Does the party limit female participation in 
the public sphere? Women can be excluded from politics or other public institutions, and 
women’s rights can be subjected to conform to the principles of sharia. 6) Does the party 
respect religious freedom of minorities? The freedom to practice a religion other than Islam 
in the public sphere can be limited, defaming Islam or the prophet can be criminalized and 
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religious minorities can be barred from the state administration. 7) Does the party limit 
freedom of expression or freedom of the press? Islamists can place limitations on individuals 
or the media to freely criticize Islam, the prophet, the Islamist party, party officials and so on.    
All these reforms can be at odds with freedom of (non)religion, freedom of expression, 
women’s rights and limit pluralistic views. 
Islamization of economics aims to implement Islamic principles to all economic 
activities within or without the public sphere. 8) Does the party restrict pubs and the use of 
alcohol? Under Islamic law the use of alcohol is prohibited, but in most Arab countries it is 
commonly available. Restrictions on pubs and the use of alcohol ensure public morality is in 
line with Islamic principles. Such restrictions in tourist sectors set profound limitations on 
the availability of these un-Islamic products. 9) Does the party strengthen the waqf system13? 
Waqf, consist of charitable organizations, funded through public endowments, that adhere 
to sharia and financially support schools, mosques and other social institutions (Al-Arabiya 
2012), thus indirectly Islamizing significant sections of the economy. 10) Does the party aim 
to Islamize monetary and fiscal systems? Islamists can prohibit banks from charging interest 
on loans, or promote Islamic investment models. Economic reforms especially have the 
potential to infringe minority rights, limit pluralistic views and alienate the West. 
 
Process of Democratic Islamization  
In the process of Islamizing society, there are different approaches that can be applied, with 
varying consequences. First, it is important whether the party is aiming for direct 
Islamization or opts for a more subtle approach: 11) Does the party directly implement 
sharia in the legal system? The most pressing issue is to what extent a reference to Islamic 
law or Islamic jurisprudence in included in the new constitutions. Sharia can further also be 
applied to specific policy-areas, such as family law, economics, or education. 12) Does the 
party actively appoint Islamists to positions in state administration? Appointments to 
Islamists can focus on the state administration, executive agencies, or semi-public 
institutions, in order to make these institutions more agreeable to Islamic reforms. Direct 
implementation of Islamic law can generate significant resistance and opposition, whereas 
                                                     
13
 A system of religious endowments where religious organizations receive land and/or property rights. 
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the subtle approach of state appointments to Islamists can largely occur without major 
upsets and still making public sphere more sympathetic to Islam.  
 Secondly, it is important whether the party avoids political conflict or ignores it:  
13) Does the party pursue Islamization despite opposition? Opposition can come from civil 
society, political parties in the opposition, the judiciary and from abroad. In each of these 
cases it is important to what extent the Islamist party manages to take a conciliatory 
approach. 14) Is the party willing to compromise on religious issues in order to build 
consensus? The question is how strict the party is in the implementation of their religious 
ideology, or if they are able to attenuate or postpone envisaged reforms in order to appease 
the opposition and build coalitions across the board. Willingness to compromise and an 
ambition to seek consensus across the board ensures that their reform agenda can build on 
enough public support, whereas a conflictual approach can quickly polarize and 
subsequently vaporize that support. 
 
5.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
The Islamist parties’ ability to reconcile the process of Islamization within a democratic arena 
will be analyzed by examining their track record – including strategies, decisions and policy-
making – of the party. A variety of sources have been examined. These include the electoral 
programs of the parties; public statements; newspaper articles; reports of (I)NGOs; op-ed 
articles; and academic literature. These have been selected on their merit in how they 
manage to represent the actions and views of the party, party leaders and party members 
on one or more of the guiding questions. To avoid an investigator bias, where the researcher 
influences research outcomes by unsound data selection (Thies 2002: 352), as much as 
possible, different sources will be consulted for each question. At least three independent 
sources for each question have been collected, but when these sources yielded 
contradictory accounts, additional sources, up to seven, have been examined.  
The structure of the empirical research, including the fourteen guiding questions was 
largely established a priori, but as data rarely fits neatly with the prior devised model (Levi 
1999: 157), has been refined somewhat during data collection and analysis. The a priori 
model consisted of salient issues in Turkey and Pakistan, whereas Tunisia and Egypt also 
displayed their own particularities. In socio-historic data, the validity of the model and the 
indicators used deserves more emphasis than reliability, which can be realized by the careful 
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selection of data sources (Fransozi 1987: 14). The chosen approach improves the context 
validity of indicators and thus improves the validity of the model (Adcock and Collier 2001: 
536).  
In order to analyze the data and assess how the party fared on each specific guiding 
question, the track record of Ennahda and MB have been compared to the cases of 
democratic Islamization that have been studied before, the AKP in Turkey and the MMA in 
Pakistan. As these parties have adopted widely varying strategies, an almost full range of 
comparability is possible. For example, in the case of women’s role in the public sphere, the 
MMA legally enforced the segregation of men and women in public places, whereas in 
Turkey, the AKP has only symbolically supported the Islamization of the societal roles of men 
and women, refraining from an attempt to legally record these. By comparing new cases 
along this range of policies, a qualitative indication can be made how the parties fared on 
each theme.  
Taken together, the fourteen guiding questions, provide a means to evaluate the 
main question and research objective of this study; to what extent the Islamist parties have 
embraced democratic principles, how profoundly they have acted on religious principles, 
how they have attempted to implement the Islamization of society, and what this means for 
the prospects of political Islam.  
 
6. Ennahda in Tunisia 
Under the guise of modernization the Islamic identity of Tunisians was barred from public 
life during Ben Ali’s rule.  As a result, the Islamist movement Ennahda had been formally 
banned and its longtime party leader Rashid Ghanouchi in exile (Haugbolle and Cavatorta 
2012: 21-22). Following Ben Ali’s ouster, Ennahda quickly reinserted itself in the public 
sphere where they quickly became the most credible movement for change. They won the 
elections with 37.0% of the vote, resulting in 89 of 217 seats in parliament. Ennahda 
subsequently formed a coalition with two secular parties, Ettakatol (20 seats) and Congress 
(29 seats)(Lusardi 2012). The new government was responsible for the dual task of governing 
the country and drafting a new constitution. Both these tasks have proved challenging at 
times because of ideological and strategic differences between the coalition partners. 
Ennahda wishes to reassert the role of religion in the public sphere while maintaining a 
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commitment to democratic norms and human rights, which they argue is compatible with 
Islamic values and objectives.  
 
6.1 Democratic Islamization in Tunisia 
The 2011 Ennahda Electoral Program (EEP) is titled ‘For Freedom, Justice and Development 
in Tunisia’ and asserts “Islam as a supreme point of reference” (EEP 2011: 3), without 
directly referring to sharia. The program further affirms the “essentials of a dignified life, 
including employment, health, education, respect for human rights without discrimination 
on the basis of sex, color, belief or wealth” (EEP 2011: 4). At the same time, Ennahda wishes 
to re-establish Islam in the public sphere: “our Islam-inspired movement *…+ works for the 
integration of ethical values in all aspects of life” (EEP 2011: 12), including education, the 
social sphere and the economic sphere.  
 
Education 
Ennahda’s ambition is to: “Bring up children within Arab and Islamic values and character” 
(EEP 2011: 70). The educational system in Tunisia is markedly secular and geared toward 
individual freedom and tolerance for others, including modern scientific theories like 
evolution (Faour 2012). Ennahda has previously opposed such “de-Islamizing” curricula, but 
has not actively pursued educational reform (Faour 2012; Islamopedia 2013). To some 
extent they do not need to as Islamization is taking place in educational spheres without 
Ennahda’s direct interference. Islamic civil society organizations have increased Islamic 
teaching on their own, following the end of repression (Donker 2013; Prince 2013). 
Nominally independent from Ennahda, these organizations are often run by Nahdaoui14. 
Some of these forces are more radical, such as the protesters at Manouba University, who 
were forcefully protesting for the right to wear a niqab in college. Ennahda first sympathized 
with their cause, but had to retract their support when the demonstrations turned ugly, as 
they were seen to condone extremists (Donker 2013). The position of women in education is 
one of the best in the region, with more girls in higher education than boys (European 
Parliament Report 2012). However, the trend is reversed in rural areas where families are 
pressured by religious ‘pseudo-charities’ to pull girls from school (Islamopedia 2013).  
                                                     
14
 Ennahda sympathizers 
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Ennahda nominally supports the rights of girls to equal education (EEP 2011: 66), 
though the Manouba incident as well as the lack of regulation of religious charity 
organizations point to covert sympathy with more conservative currents (Donker 2013). 
Subtle Islamization of education is taking place, but Ennahda’s role is rather ambiguous, 
without drastic reforms, but with a clandestine support for societal forces that push for 
Islamization.  
 
Social 
The issue of women’s headdress is a larger social issue than the education sphere alone. 
Both the niqab and the hijab have made a reappearance in Tunisian society (Cook 2013), 
following Ennahda’s overturn of the law banning religious symbols (Giacalone 2012). 
Ennahda frames this as a specific freedom of religion issue, ensuring that they will not force 
women to dress in a particular way (Chrisafis 2011). In fact, one of the female members in 
parliament on behalf of Ennahda does not wear a veil (Hamid 2011; Lawrence 2011). Still, 
even without strict enforcement of dress codes, women are reported to wear the veil to 
avoid public disapprovement or even harassment (Dettmer 2013). 
The position of women in the public sphere came under even more scrutiny following 
the clumsy phrasing of Ennahda members of an article in the constitution, referring to the 
‘complementary’ role of men and women, instead of ‘equality’ between men and women (Al 
Yafai 2012). Ennahda’s own program has strong language emphasizing the important role of 
women in social, political and economic spheres yet also mentions that besides equality, 
women and men complement each other (EEP 2011: 66). This reflects the conservative view 
of Ennahda members concerning the role of women and men in the family (Al Yafai 2012). 
The party ultimately compromised their position following domestic and international 
controversy, accepting a direct reference of equality in the constitution (Marks 2014). The 
‘complementary’ controversy was an awkward issue for Ennahda, as they try very hard to 
prove their commitment to women’s rights. In fact, Ennahda is the only political party in 
Tunisia, where almost half of the MP’s are female (Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2014), and 42 
out of the 49 women in the assembly represent Ennahda (Lawrence 2011). 
The memory of being repressed in their religious identity led Ennahda to include “the 
right to freedom of faith and conscience and the rights of religious minorities” in their 
program (EEP 2011: 16). Ennahda leadership has repeatedly stated that religion is a personal 
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matter (Haugbolle and Cavatorta 2012), that the state should not prescribe (Heneghan 2011; 
Rogler 2012). Indeed, small Christian and Jewish minorities (98% of Tunisians are Muslim) 
have been free to practice their religion (Freedom House 2014). More controversial is the 
freedom of non-religion, as Ennahda members openly pushed for an article in the 
constitution to criminalize blasphemy (Middle East Online 2012), aimed to defend “all that 
which is sacred” (Marks 2014). The legislation was immediately opposed by civil society 
organizations and the secular coalition parties. In the end, the party backed down on the 
issue, despite some members strongly sympathizing with the original phrasing (Hamid 2014; 
Marks 2012). The issue reignited again around the showing of the film Persepolis. The 
friction between freedom of expression and protection of sacred values became clear when 
a television broadcaster was arrested and put to trial for airing the film Persepolis, an 
animated film including a depiction of God. A public protest ensued at the TV station, which 
Ennahda publicly condemned while reassuring that they thought the film was considered a 
“violation of the sacred” (Shadid 2012).  
Ennahda guarantees the freedom of the press in their program (EEP 2011: 20), 
though this is not in line with these events, as the freedom of expression is under serious 
threat. Islamic principles seem to outweigh democratic principles in this instance. Freedom 
of religion and women’s rights are better preserved, though some pressures, both from 
societal forces as Ennahda’s wording of the constitutional draft, definitely exist. 
 
Economic 
In economics Ennahda promotes a fairly modern agenda, supporting a neo-liberal economic 
model (Prince 2013; Lippincott 2011), and promotes trade relations with the EU (Lusardi 
2012). As a major source of income, restoring tourism is high on the political agenda, and the 
party refrains from restrictions on alcohol, pubs and bikinis (Bradley 2011; Al-Rashed 2011), 
despite protests against these ‘western immoralities’ (Cook 2013). Ennahda has responded 
to these protests by stating that they would campaign against morally reprehensible 
behavior, but would not ban it (Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2013). More polarized debate 
surrounded the intended introduction of the waqf system, intended to create an “Islamic 
welfare state” (Ben Hamida 2013; Torelli, Merone and Cavatorta 2012). Opponents argue 
that this system will effectively create an Islamic aristocracy, which will indirectly further the 
Islamization of society (El-Afraoui 2013). Combined with the introduction of Islamic finance, 
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Islamic banks and Islamic insurance (EEP 2011: 32), this would form the basis of a social and 
economic system in line with Islamic principles (Ben Hamida 2013). The proposal is opposed 
by secular parties, and the increased controversy might again cause Ennahda leadership to 
withdraw the overzealous work of its rank-and-file MPs (Hamid 2014).  
In the end, the economy has not witnessed a vigorous process of Islamization, though 
again societal forces more openly push for adherence to Islamic principles. Thus far the party 
has not openly endorsed these forces, and the Islamization of the economy seems a far way 
off. 
 
6.2 Process of Islamization in Tunisia: Testing the Waters  
It should come as no surprise that a discussion about sharia featured prominently in Tunisia 
after Ennahda’s electoral victory. Ennahda leadership, in an attempt to position themselves 
as a viable moderate party, always denied any intention to impose religious norms on 
society (Heneghan 2011), instead supporting a pluralistic view of the political sphere (Faour 
2012). Controversy did ensue when Ennahda lawmakers submitted a constitutional draft 
indicating “Islamic law as an important reference for the national judicial system” (Giacalone 
2012). The issue was brought before the party congress where it was eventually voted down, 
and the current constitutional article would remain in place (Merone and Cavatorta 2013). 
That article reads that “Islam is the religion of Tunisia”, without further reference to sharia 
or Islamic law (Gallala-Arndt 2012; Lusardi 2012). Party leader Ghanouchi explained the 
decision to drop the reference by arguing: “we want to bring the fuss over sharia to an end 
and get on to the most pressing problem: unemployment” (Bechri 2012).  
In ideological matters, Ennahda has attempted to Islamize society in a number of 
cases. In general, the party backed down on these reforms once they met with substantial 
opposition (Cook 2013). It appears that Ennahda is testing the limits of its power, but is 
afraid to overstep them. They have a clear vision of how they want to organize society, but 
when they meet opposition, they withdraw to appease the opposition, thus maintaining 
their position in power. Ennahda now seems content to refrain from a strategy of direct 
Islamization (Faour 2012), and has instead opted for a gradualist long-term process of re-
Islamization (Marks 2014; Hamid 2014). This has given them the opportunity to embed 
themselves in the institutional landscape and appoint Ennahda supporters in the state 
administration (Torelli, Merone and Cavatorta 2012; Donker 2012). This has raised 
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suspicions of subtle Islamization, especially by indirect pressure on the public (Dettmer 
2013). 
In political matters, we have witnessed Ennahda to withdraw their religious agenda 
when they meet with substantive resistance. References in the constitution concerning 
blasphemy, sharia and women’s complementarity have been retracted after they met with 
both domestic and international resistance (Cook 2013). Ennahda appears to be willing to 
compromise on their religious agenda, when it concerns their viability as a political party 
(Merone and Cavatorta 2013; Marks 2014). This political pragmatism is also reflected in their 
electoral program, emphasizing the necessity of compromise and consensus for the well-
being of Tunisian society (EEP 2011: 20). They have first demonstrated this pragmatism 
when they entered into a coalition government with two secular parties (Aarts et al. 2012), 
and these parties have set clear limits to the reforms that Ennahda can pursue (Lusardi 2012). 
Ennahda understood well that they did not command a majority and needed secular and 
leftist parties in the coalition in order to govern (Lusardi 2012; Hamid 2011). It is exactly this 
political pragmatism that has kept Ennahda in the seat of power (Torelli, Merone and 
Cavatorta 2012). 
The courts are nominally independent (Freedom House 2014), which also finds clear 
support in the Ennahda program (EEP 2011: 17). However, Ennahda has attempted to gain 
control over certain appointments in the justice sector (Larbi 2013; Crane 2014). This 
meddling has made some justices more agreeable to the conservative principles of the 
Islamists. Under the guise of ‘public decency’, the broadcaster of Persepolis has been 
brought to trial (Middle East Online 2012), as well as two youths who posted cartoons of the 
prophet Mohammed (Amara 2012). These instances constitute clear challenges to free 
speech, which has provoked other parts of the judicial sector to strike and protest the 
government’s interference in the independence of the justice sector (Larbi 2013). 
In conclusion, Ennahda appears to be both willing and able to compromise on their 
religious agenda, opting for a consensus-based reform agenda. Furthermore, they have 
refrained from a direct implementation of sharia, which has given them the opportunity to 
install Nahdaoui in a number of important state positions. As a result, the process of 
democratic Islamization in Tunisia can be classified as consensus-based, subtle Islamization 
(see figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Democratic Islamization in Tunisia 
At the same time, Ennahda has been testing the limits of their power, illustrated by attempts 
to include a reference to Islamic law in the constitution, referring to women as 
complementary, attempts to legally criminalize blasphemy and the use of public morality to 
justify the de facto limitation of religious freedom. Despite these possible pitfalls, which will 
likely remain salient in the future, Ennahda has done a relatively good job in reconciling 
democratic and Islamic principles. 
 
7. Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
MB was founded in 1928 as a militant organization, though the party has experienced a 
transformation during the last decades, moving to a non-violent strategy (Pratt 2007: 134-
135). MB had been banned and repressed under the Mubarak regime for decades (Joffe 
2011: 514), formally prohibited and its leadership harassed. Their decade-long presence and 
opposition to the regime gave them substantial legitimacy as a movement for change.  
Following Mubarak’s ouster, the MB did not participate in the elections themselves because 
the constitution prohibited parties based on religion to participate. Instead, The Freedom 
and Justice (FJP), the political wing of MB entered the elections. Nominally independent, the 
two entities operate in unity and observers seldom differentiate between the two (Jadaliyya 
2011). Engaged in decade-long grass-roots activity, MB was quick to mobilize their social 
base while other political parties had to build their organization from scratch (Tessler, Jamal 
and Robbins 2012: 100). As a result, the FJP won the elections in Egypt with 37.5% of the 
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vote, giving them 242 out of 498 seats in parliament. In addition the Al-Nour party15, 
acquired 27.8% of the vote (Wright 2012). Following the parliamentary elections, FJP also 
won the presidential elections in June 2012, running a long time MB member, Mohamed 
Morsi, as a candidate (Bechri 2012). 
 
7.1 Democratic Islamization in Egypt 
The newly established FJP drafted an election program for the 2011 elections. The electoral 
program includes many Qur’anic references, and directly builds on the principles of sharia. 
The program further asserts the importance of “achieving social justice that will preserve the 
citizens’ dignity, safeguard their rights and provide a decent life for all, irrespective of class, 
status or affiliation” (EP: 2).  
 
Education 
The MB has focused on educational activities long before they came to power (Hamid 2014), 
with the aim to create a social base through education and socialization in Islam (Joffe 2011: 
515; Kassem 2012: 84). Young people should be educated in the principles of Islam (EP: 26), 
and chastity and modesty should be incorporated in school curricula (EP: 25). The re-
Islamization of school curricula in Egypt has stepped up pace since the Ministry of Education 
came under MB control (Tadros, M. 2013; AsiaNews 2013). Subtle changes have been 
occurring, such as the removal of unveiled women in schoolbooks. Education is not 
considered a direct priority of the MB now that they are in power. Why should it be, to a 
large extent the current educational system is already in line with MB’s long-term goals. The 
secular regime approved curricula largely compatible with Islamic principles to 
accommodate the majority of the population (Faour 2012). This particularly affects the 
position of women in education as they are often portrayed in school curricula as obedient 
housewives and dedicated mothers. This subtly eschews equality between men and women 
(Komsan 2013), though officially FJP supports the role of women in education (Jadaliyya 
2011). However, this support is sometimes badly disguised discrimination, as the suggestion 
to segregate school classes to prevent sexual harassment, reveals (Dyer 2013). 
                                                     
15
 A puritan Islamist party, advocating the strict application of sharia. 
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 The FJP has refrained from drastic changes in the educational system. This is partly 
because the educational system is largely already in line with Islamist goals, including 
curricula that emphasize the role of women in the family. However, such Islamic principles 
have not been pushed further during Islamist rule. 
 
Social 
Another method to safeguard public morality and avoid harassment of women is to wear a 
veil in public. The veil is not legally enforced (Cook 2013), but is strongly encouraged by the 
FJP (Dyer 2013). As the Secretary-General of FJP, El-Katatni explains: “I cannot draft a law 
that says an unveiled woman will be forbidden *…+, but I must make her feel that her 
punishment is in the afterlife” (Reuters 2011). The veil is now more prominently present in 
public life, well-illustrated by the fact that most news anchorwomen now wear the veil (Al-
Sayyad 2013). FJP’s party platform confirms women’s rights, though limits these to be 
consistent with Islamic principles (EP: 12). This includes a re-evaluation of the principles laid 
out in the international Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), as these touch on marital and family relations (EP: 24), and are 
considered to undermine Islamic principles (Kingsley 2013). Politics in general is no place for 
women it seems, as a quota for women in parliament has been revoked, diminishing 
women’s ratio from 10% in 2010 to just 2% in 2012 (Kingsley 2013). The new constitution 
further limits women’s rights to be consistent with Islamic principles (Freedom House 2013). 
Women, together with Christians, are also considered unsuitable for the presidency (Egypt 
Independent 2011a; Peninsula 2011). Both women and Copts were initially included in the 
rank and file of the FJP, but have since been leaving (Jadaliyya 2011). 
Inter-religious tensions between Muslims and the considerable Coptic Christian 
minority16  flare up whenever Islamization policies touch upon their autonomy (Springborg 
2011: 10; Jadaliyya 2011). Formally, the FJP platform defends freedom of religion and 
bestows equal citizenship on both Muslims and Christians (EP: 11). However, in the new 
constitution an article is included that prohibits the defamation of the prophet. In practice 
this article can be utilized as a blasphemy law, limiting religious freedom of all non-Muslims 
(Tadros, M. 2013). The article also limits the freedom of expression. FJP formally subscribes 
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 Approximately 9% of the population 
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to freedom of expression and freedom of the press (EP: 9), as long as these are in line with 
public morality (EP: 39). However, in practice, freedom of expression is more and more 
limited, with attempts to appoint the editors-in-chief of all major newspapers, in order to 
comply with Islamic moral standards (Tayel: 2012). Defamation of the President has similarly 
become a criminal offense, limiting freedom of expression even further. A number of TV 
hosts experienced this first-hand when they were charged after they publicly criticized 
president Morsi (Freedom House 2013). As a result, journalists and media figures have 
become quite reluctant to publicly criticize Islam, the MB, or the President (Al-Sayyad 2013; 
Freedom House 2013). 
 In conclusion, attempts of Islamization in the social sphere are relatively profound, 
with the limitation of women’s role in the public sphere, public pressure on women to wear 
a veil and the limitation of religious freedom and freedom of expression by criminalizing 
defamation of the prophet and the president. These developments notably contrast with 
democratic principles and reveal the ideological goals of the MB in the public sphere. 
 
Economic 
Egypt is heavily dependent on the tourism sector, which has struggled considerably due to 
recent political upheavals. In an attempt to strengthen the economy, the tourism industry 
has to be revitalized. FJP dedicates considerable attention in its program on tourism and the 
necessity of western tourism (Egypt Independent 2011b). At the same time, they wish to 
regulate the moral standards of society, including tourism sectors and the film industry (EP: 
23-38). While the party would want to limit the use of alcohol (Hamid 2011), they have 
refrained from such decrees to avoid international and domestic outcry (Cook 2013). 
An area of the economy that is more influenced by Islamic principles is the 
endowments system, waqf. FJP has dedicated itself to revive the system of waqf (EP: 17), in 
order to fight poverty and unemployment (El-Shorbagi 2013). The system has been in place 
during autocratic rule, but has been re-ignited with the appointment of thousands of MB 
members to waqf institutions (Barak 2013). The revival of the waqf system is part of a larger 
plan to Islamize the economy (Al-Arabiya 2012). Other parts of that plan include the 
establishment of Islamic monetary institutions (EP: 28). These are argued to improve the 
ailing Egyptian economy (Kassem 2012: 85; Jadaliyya 2011). A bill was introduced to urge 
banks from extracting interest from customers (Grewal 2012).  
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In general, the FJP did not manage to dramatically transform the economic system, 
which is largely still dominated by old ideas and run by “old faces” (Turkish Review 2014). 
Islamization of the economy is risky as Egypt already has to deal with an ailing economy and 
it clearly needs the income of the tourism sector and foreign investments. However, in the 
long-term, FJP has an agenda for the economic sector to conform to Islamic principles. 
 
7.2 Process of Islamization in Egypt: Diving Right In 
The FJP program contains many references to the Qur’an and sharia (EP 2011). This is 
underlined by Morsi’s victory speech for the presidential elections: “The Qur’an is our 
constitution and sharia is our guide” (Bechri 2012). At the same time, they present 
themselves as a civil party. However, this could also result from the legal ban on religious 
political parties (Peninsula 2011). In power, FJP has endorsed a considerable Islamist agenda, 
including a provision in the constitution giving the religious scholars of the Al-Azhar 
university the right to be consulted on all matters pertaining to Islamic law (Cook 2013). The 
new constitution further refers to Islamic jurisprudence as the foundation of the legislative 
framework (Tadros, M. 2013). MB has also been actively appointing its supporters in state 
administration positions (Cook 2013). This has already been illustrated by the cases of 
editors-in-chief of major newspapers (Spencer 2012) and waqf administration (Barak 2013). 
Islamization of state administration is also reinforced as the Shura Council17 has been tasked 
with appointments in many state agencies, including counter-corruption, press, media and 
educational agencies (Al-Sayyad 2013). 
Formally, FJP endorses the political pluralist ideal (EP: 10), and urges all political 
actors to cooperate to rebuild the country (EP: 42). Islamists hold a parliamentary majority 
and control most important committee positions (Grewal 2012), but the FJP has been very 
cautious to align themselves with the puritan Al-Nour party (Ikhwan 2011). To further 
alleviate secular and liberal concerns over the Islamist majority, FJP pledged not to field a 
candidate for the November 2012 presidential elections, in order to build a coalition across 
the field. This pluralist rhetoric has subsequently been put in doubt by the unilateralist 
approach of the Islamists (Freedom House 2013). In the end, MB reneged on their pledge 
and fielded a presidential candidate, Muhammad Morsi, anyway (Dawn 2013).  
                                                     
17
 88% of the Shura Council is Islamist 
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The party’s electoral success has quickly been overshadowed by power struggles with 
opposition, civil society and the judiciary (Laub 2014). Conflict with the opposition ensued 
with the drafting of the constitution, which has been criticized for its content, the drafting 
process ánd the ratification through a public referendum (Tadros, M. 2013). In response, FJP 
supporters denounced liberal parties by asserting that they wish to inhibit the Muslim 
identity, and to sink the country into decadence (Turkish Review 2014). The picture that MB 
shed most of its conciliatory approach once it came to power is further reinforced by their 
position toward the Coptic minority, who have come under more pressure during MB’s reign 
(Tadros, S. 2013). The Islamists control about 70% of the Constituent Assembly18. Secular 
and liberal forces rejected the Islamist control and argued for a national coalition to 
compose a new constitution. When the Islamists refused, they quit the Assembly (Gallala-
Arndt 2012). 
The power struggle with the judiciary is even more telling about the conflictual 
approach of Morsi and the FJP (Freedom House 2013). In its program, FJP devotes 
considerable attention to the independence of the judiciary (EP: 11-13). However, this 
commitment soon disappeared when the Supreme Constitutional Court declared the 2011 
parliamentary elections unconstitutional, because of irregularities surrounding electoral laws 
(Freedom House 2013). To protect himself and his party from the judiciary, President Morsi 
subsequently decreed himself and the Constituent Assembly to be immune from judicial 
review, while also usurping legislative and executive powers (Benstead et al. 2013; Laub 
2014). This move met with widespread opposition (Allen 2012; Grewal 2012), and Morsi was 
quickly compared with Mubarak’s legacy (Al-Sayyad 2013). Subsequently, a number of 
judges and prosecutors rose up in protest and boycotted the courts (Allen 2012). Meanwhile, 
MB supporters launched a smear campaign against the judiciary in the media and on the 
streets, rallying before Court houses, protesting their political interference (Turkish Review 
2014). In late 2012, Morsi again attempted to interfere with the judicial branch, by removing 
a public prosecutor. This time the entire judicial sector rose up in protest, and Morsi had to 
back down (Al-Sayyad 2013). The new constitution that was eventually passed in a 
controversial referendum validated President Morsi’s decrees (Tadros, M. 2013). 
                                                     
18
 Charged with drafting a new constitution 
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 Since they came to power, FJP has been involved with power struggles with the 
opposition, civil society and the judiciary. The conflictual approach of the Islamists illustrates 
that they are unable and unwilling to compromise their agenda in order to seek consensus 
across the board. Their term in power has been marred by political conflicts. Their approach 
can therefore be classified as both direct and conflicted (see figure 3). Attempts of 
Islamization through appointments to positions in state administration have previously been 
construed as subtle Islamization, but in the case of Egypt, these attempts have been neither 
subtle nor uncontested. 
 
Figure 3: Democratic Islamization in Egypt 
In conclusion, the process of democratic Islamization in Egypt has led to a significant number 
of conflicts, due to the Islamists inability to credibly frame their religious agenda in a 
democratic framework, and work together with other actors. Political conflicts have even 
eclipsed ideological struggles. The constitutional draft has been criticized on the process of 
drafting and ratification, even though the content should have been central. In the end, the 
MB has not been able to satisfactorily demonstrate that they are committed to the 
democratic process and democratic principles, instead usurping judicial and legislative 
processes in a power struggle that has pushed the country to the brink of turmoil. 
 
  
Arthur Belle |     Compatibility of Islam and Democracy: 
                              Islamist Parties in Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab Spring 
- 32 - 
 
8. Conclusion 
Following their electoral victories, Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt have been given the 
opportunity to demonstrate the viability of their Islamist ideology in the democratic arena. 
Starting from similar positions, both parties envision a greater role for Islam in the public 
sphere. This study has analyzed to what extent this project of Islamization has been 
compatible with democratic principles. In the practice of governing and policy-making, both 
countries have witnessed a number of tensions between democratic and Islamic principles.  
In education, subtle changes occurred, but these are mostly beyond the direct reach 
of the parties. In Tunisia, societal pressure on girls to wear a veil or in the rural areas to leave 
school is mounting. In Egypt, similar pressures on women in education exist to wear a veil or 
to segregate classrooms to prevent sexual harassment. Both parties have not strongly 
reacted against these developments, making their position at least ambiguous. However, 
until now, neither party has actively pursued drastic changes in curricula or the educational 
system.  
In the public sphere, societal pressure on women to wear the veil is increasing, 
though neither party has enforced a dress code. In Tunisia, the veil has reappeared after 
being banned, while it has become ubiquitous in Egypt. Women’s rights in general have 
come under pressure in both countries. In Tunisia, controversy surrounded the 
‘complementarity of women’-issue. Though mainly symbolic, the debate dominated the 
news until Ennahda relented. The political arena is more open to women, as in fact, about 
half of Ennahda MPs are women. In Egypt, women constituted only 2% of the parliament in 
2012, and women are considered unfit for the presidency. More concrete is the challenge to 
the freedom of (non)religion. Attempts to criminalize blasphemy were derailed in Tunisia, 
though the judiciary can still prosecute in reference to public morality. In Egypt, both the 
defamation of the prophet and the President have been criminalized, severely limiting both 
religious freedom and freedom of expression.  
In economics Islamists generally aim to restrict un-Islamic products and practices 
(Pupcenoks 2012: 288). However, both Tunisia and Egypt are dependent on tourism and 
have thus not actively restricted the use of alcohol or pubs. More notable are efforts to 
revitalize or strengthen the system of waqf. This met with strong opposition in Tunisia, but 
has silently been reinvigorated in Egypt. Other long-term goals such as Islamic banks, 
Arthur Belle |     Compatibility of Islam and Democracy: 
                              Islamist Parties in Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab Spring 
- 33 - 
 
insurance and economic system are nominally supported by both parties, but have not been 
actively pursued, instead opting for neo-liberal economic policies to attract foreign 
investment. 
One of the main concerns of skeptics of the compatibility of democracy and Islam is 
the supposed primacy of sharia (Otto 2010: 29; Roy 2012). As a result, the discussion about 
sharia prominently featured in both countries. Ennahda eventually retreated on the issue 
because of domestic and international pressure, but in Egypt a reference to Islamic law as a 
source of legislation was incorporated in the new constitution. Islamist parties also attempt 
to control appointments in the public sphere, appointing party sympathizers in numerous 
public institutions. This process has been relatively subtle in Tunisia, while in Egypt these 
appointments have been rather direct to the point that they sparked protest. 
When they met with opposition, Ennahda generally withdrew their reformist agenda, 
opting for a pragmatic consensus-seeking approach instead. In contrast, the MB was 
considerably less willing to compromise (Aarts et al. 2012: 85), as their power struggles with 
both the opposition and judiciary illustrate. Seculars and Coptic minorities were practically 
sidelined from the process of writing a new constitution, while the judiciary’s powers were 
usurped by president Morsi when he decreed himself emergency powers. 
In this view of Ennahda resembles the subtle, indirect approach of the AKP model, 
while the MB resembles the direct, conflicted approach of the MMA. Apart from societal 
pressure on gender equality, freedom of religion and freedom of expression, Ennahda has 
shown a significant commitment to democratic norms such as pluralism and consensus-
seeking. As such the Tunisian case is well-positioned to serve as an example where 
democratic and Islamic principles can be reconciled, and thus inspire other countries in the 
region. In Egypt, more substantial pressures exist on gender equality, freedom of religion 
and freedom of expression, with the added obstacle of a party in power that appears unable 
to share that power and seek compromise with the opposition. During its time in power, the 
MB has come to clash with secular opposition, minority groups and the judiciary. Contrasting 
the relatively optimistic prospects of political Islam in Tunisia, the MB has not been able to 
reconcile democratic principles with their ideology. It appears the discussion about the 
compatibility of democracy and Islam will be far from over.  
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